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The search and matching model has recently come under criticism for its inability to 
account for some of the cyclical properties of the U.S. labor market. Shimer (2005) has 
shown that the basic version of the model is incapable of reproducing the volatility of the 
market tightness for reasonable movements in productivity. This paper considers whether 
the so-called “Shimer Puzzle” also holds for the Japanese economy. We present empirical 
evidence on the cyclical properties of the labor market variables in Japan and compare 
these to their U.S. counterparts. We then build, parametrize, and simulate three different 
versions of the search and matching model (with exogenous job destruction, with 
endogenous job destruction, and embedded in a Real Business Cycle model) and compare 
the simulated statistics to the data. We find that the “Shimer Puzzle” does hold for Japan, 
since the model is unable to generate as much volatility on the market tightness as in the 
data.   
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The search and matching model has become the standard method for modeling equilibrium unemployment
in the labor market. While traditionally used to address questions related the steady state, it has also
become widely used for studying cyclical issues. It is for the latter use that the model has been criticized
in recent years.
Shimer (2005) has shown that the search and matching model is unable to reproduce some basic
cyclical properties of the U.S. labor market data. This failure of the model when used at business cycle
frequencies has come to be known as the “Shimer Puzzle,” which states that the basic search and matching
model is not able, using empirically plausible movements in productivity, to generate as much volatility
in the ratio of unemployment to vacancies as is observed in the data. The paper has started a strand
of the literature that studiesthe countries and conditions for which the puzzle holds, and the types of
features that might be be added to the model.
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether this volatility puzzle, which was originally found for the
U.S., holds for the Japanese economy. We ﬁrst provide empirical evidence on the cyclical properties of
the Japanese labor market in the last three decades. We then build a search and matching model that
nests three diﬀerent versions of the model; we calibrate the model parameters to match the long-run
evidence of the Japanese economy, and we simulate the three versions of the model to assess whether the
“Shimer Puzzle” holds for Japan. 1
We show empirically that the Japanese and U.S. labor markets exhibit some important diﬀerences in
terms of the levels of the variables. Unemployment was, until the 1990s, much lower in Japan than in the
U.S., but so were the job-ﬁnding and separation rates. These variables seem to be more stable for Japan
than the U.S. when considering the evolution of their levels over time. However, these diﬀerences in levels
do not translate into substantial discrepancies when analyzing the cyclical properties of the variables. We
ﬁnd that the volatility of unemployment, vacancies, job-ﬁnding and separation rates, and productivity are
not very diﬀerent between the two countries. Perhaps the biggest diﬀerence between the two economies
is the fact that the job-ﬁnding and separation rates are much less autocorrelated for Japan, and that the
job separation rate shows a clear counter-cyclical pattern. This negative correlation between productivity
and the job separation rate leads us to build the theory such that it includes not only exogenous and
time-invariant job separation rates (as in Shimer, 2005), but also a possible endogenous destruction.
Our model nests three basic but important versions of the search and matching model. The ﬁrst
1Note that the aim of this paper is to study whether the volatility puzzle holds for Japan - that is, if the basic and
standard versions of the search and matching model fail or succeed in reproducing the cyclical patterns of the Japanese
labor market variables, particularly, the market tightness, as is the case for the U.S. We do not intend to analyze which of
the diﬀerent solutions that have been put forward in the literature could solve the puzzle for Japan, and therefore leave this
problem for future research.
2version (Model 1) is a simple exogenous job destruction search and matching model, very similar to the
one used in Shimer (2005). The second version (Model 2) is constructed along the same lines of the
ﬁrst, but allows for time-varying endogenous job destruction, which captures the previously mentioned
empirical counter-cyclical job separation rate of the Japanese economy. The third version (Model 3) is
a more elaborate Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with labor market search frictions. We study this
general equilibrium version of the search and matching model, since the RBC model has become the
workhorse in modern macroeconomics for studying business cycle ﬂuctuations. All three versions of the
model are nested in the general model presented below and calibrated to match the long-run empirical
evidence from the Japanese economy, which is assumed to correspond to the steady state of the model.
We then simulate the model and compare it to the data.
We ﬁnd that that the “Shimer Puzzle” does indeed hold for the Japanese economy. None of the three
versions of the model is able to generate the empirically observed volatility in the market tightness. Model
1 is unable to produce suﬃcient volatility in either unemployment or vacancies, which in the Japanese
calibration of the model is due, as Shimer (2005) points out for the U.S., to the fact that wages are too
responsive to productivity movements.2 In Models 2 and 3, the inclusion of endogenous job separation
renders unemployment and vacancies more volatile, but generates a counter-factual positive correlation
between unemployment and vacancies that in turn keeps the volatility of the market tightness much lower
than in the data. The intuition for this result is that since unemployment is much more responsive due
to the possibility of adjusting the separation margin, and the incentive to post vacancies is positively
correlated with the number of unemployed workers,3 the eﬀect of the movement in unemployment (and
hence in the probability of matching for a vacant ﬁrm) dominates the eﬀect of productivity on future
proﬁts, and makes unemployment and vacancies move closely together. This eﬀect is even more important
in the RBC model, which includes capital and hours of work, where the unemployment rate is more
sensitive to productivity movements.
The original articles by Shimer (2005) spawned a large and growing literature assessing the conditions
under which the volatility puzzle holds. Some papers attempt to study which features of the model are
necessary to reconcile theory and data. A known example of this literature is Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), which shows that a large ﬂow value of unemployment restores the incentive for ﬁrms to post va-
cancies, even under Nash bargaining. Since the Nash bargaining for wages is at the core of the mechanism
that generates the “Shimer Puzzle,” papers such as Hall (2005), Gertler and Trigari (2005), or Hall and
Milgrom (2005) study diﬀerent wage arrangements that help reconcile the model with the data. Other
publications question whether the “Shimer Puzzle” holds at all for the U.S. economy: Fujita and Ramey
2This in turn is due to the assumption of Nash bargaining for wages, which allows for wage changes whenever there is a
change in the economy.
3For instance, the larger the number of unemployed workers, the greater the chance for every vacant ﬁrm to match with
a worker, and therefore the larger the incentive to post vacancies.
3(2009) is exemplary of this strand of the literature. Finally, there are papers that study whether the
“Shimer Puzzle” holds for other countries. Our paper falls into this category. Other works, such as Sala
and Silva (2007), and Sala, Silva and Toledo (2007), study how the model is able to explain the data for
Spain, or the OECD countries, respectively.
For Japan, a recent paper by Miyamoto (2009) studies a question similar to ours.4 Our paper diﬀers
in the following points: ﬁrst, we construct the Japanese unemployment and job worker ﬂows data directly
from the LFS micro data; second, we put the Japanese empirical evidence in perspective by comparing it
with that of the U.S. for the same sample period; third, we perform numerical simulations of the model to
be able to thoroughly compare the model implications with the data. While the methodology to answer
the question in both papers is diﬀerent, the conclusion is the same. The “Shimer Puzzle” does hold for
the Japanese economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the empirical evidence for Japan
and compares it with that of the U.S.; Section 3 develops the model that nests the three diﬀerent versions
studied; Section 4 explains the calibration of the model parameters; Section 5 shows the simulation results
and compares them to the data; ﬁnally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section studies the empirical properties of the Japanese labor market, both in levels and in terms of
deviations from trend. To put the Japanese numbers in perspective, we compare them with their U.S.
counterparts. We ﬁrst explain the sources for the U.S. data and the data for Japan is constructed; we
then proceed to analyze the latter.
2.1 Data Construction
For the U.S., the data on unemployment and output per worker5 comes from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The data on vacancies in the Help Wanted Advertising Index series is from the Conference
Board and collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The job-ﬁnding and separation rates are
from Fujita and Ramey (2009); we have undone the continuous-time transformation explained in equation
(2), p. 418, in order to obtain discrete time rates, which are consistent with the model we use. Finally,
the data on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is from Braun, Esteban-Pretel, Okada, and Sudou (2006).
For Japan, the data on unemployment and worker ﬂows are constructed using micro data from the
Labor Force Survey (LFS) of the Japanese Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center. The data on vacancies
comes from the Job Placement Survey (JPS) of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The data
4Both papers were developed simultaneously and without knowledge of each other.
5The series used is output per person in non-farm business.
4on productivity, both output per worker and TFP, is from Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka (2010).
Let us now explain in more detail the construction of the labor market data using the LFS.
The LFS is a monthly household survey, where each household is surveyed for two consecutive months,
is excluded from the survey for the next ten months, and then included again for another two consecutive
months. In its structure, the LFS is comparable to the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) in the United
States. Like the CPS, the LFS provides the necessary information to calculate the labor market ﬂows.
In the survey structure, 50 percent of those sampled each month are in their second month of the survey.
Hence, it is possible to observe the transition among the three statuses of employment: employed (E),
unemployed (U), or not-in-the-labor-force (I) by matching the information with the employment status
in the previous month.6 With three employment statuses, we have nine categories of worker ﬂows; EE,
EU, EI, UU, UI, UE, II, IE and IU.
Given the survey design of the LFS, we follow the matching method used by Shimer (2007) and
Fujita and Ramey (2009) to construct the worker ﬂow data. Individual records are matched over two
consecutive months using selected information: unique household identiﬁers,7 individual line numbers,
gender, and age. We then compute the sample-weighted gross ﬂows across three states, employment E,
unemployment U,a n dn o t - i n - t h e - l a b o r - f o r c eI, so that the ﬂows between the three states are obtained
for the nine categories mentioned above. If we let Ωit be the sample weight of worker i at month t in the
LFS, and ΓXZ
t be the number of workers who move from state X ∈{ E,U,I} to state Z ∈{ E,U,I} at







The transition probabilities follow from the ﬂows. For example, the transition probability from employ-








Since our paper focuses on worker ﬂows between employment and unemployment, we restrict our
attention to pUE
t and pEU
t , which we refer to as job-ﬁnding and separation rates, respectively, in the
subsequent text.
Finally, the time series of unemployment is based on the ﬂow data and is not identical to that obtained
using the stock data, as the former is calculated with a subset of samples from the latter. To construct
6The LFS is conducted in the ﬁnal week of each month. In the LFS, the unemployed are deﬁned as those without a job
and who did not work at all during the reference week, those who would beready to work if work were available, and those
engaged in any job-seeking activity or preparing to start business during the same week. This deﬁnition of unemployment
is consistent with the deﬁnition by the International Labour Organization.
7We construct the unique household identiﬁers using the sample area code, interview period, and household character-
istics.
5ﬂow data consistent with the stock data, we adjust the ﬂow data using the correction method employed
by the Ministry of Labor (1985). This method has been used by many authors, including Ohta and
Teruyama (2003a) and Sakura (2005), and is similar to that applied by Fujita and Ramey (2009) in the
U.S.
All data, both for Japan and the U.S., has been seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau X-12
method, logged and HP ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
2.2 Cyclical Properties of Japan’s Labor Market Variables
We now proceed to analyze the cyclical characteristics of the Japanese labor market. We are mainly
interested in the cyclical behavior of four of the main labor market variables: the unemployment rate,
vacancies, and the job-ﬁnding and separation rates. In order to put these cyclical properties into a global
context, we compare these variables, both with regard to levels and in deviations from trend, with their
U.S. counterparts.
Figures 1 to 4 and Table 1 summarize the evolution over time and the cyclical properties of the labor
market variables of interest, as well as two measures of productivity: output per worker and TFP.
Levels
We can see in the top-left panel of Figure 1 that the unemployment rate in Japan was historically
lower than in the U.S. until the end of the 1990s. In the post-war period,8 Japan’s unemployment
rate was seemingly more stable than that of the U.S., with levels between 1 and 2.5 percent until the
beginning of the 1990s, when it started to increase, reaching a maximum of 5.4 percent in 2002. The U.S.
unemployment rate ﬂuctuated between 2 and 11 percent during the same period.
If we consider the worker ﬂows underlying the previously explained low levels of Japanese unemploy-
ment in comparison with the U.S., we ﬁnd that workers in Japan transition much less frequently between
employment and unemployment. Figure 3 shows that both the monthly job-ﬁnding and separation rates
are lower in Japan than in the U.S., although these diﬀerences have decreased in recent years for the
separation rate. These low worker ﬂow rates in Japan are a well known fact that was sustained for many
years by the traditional employment practice of lifetime employment at a ﬁrm. With the Lost Decade,
such lifetime employment guarantees are no longer as widespread, which partially explains the rise in the
level of the job separation rate.
8The available Labor Force Survey micro data for Japan does not allow us to calculate the unemployment rate before
1983. Hence the data prior to 1983 is obtained from the Statistics Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and
Communication at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/index.htm
6Cyclicality
While the previously explained level diﬀerences in the labor market variables between Japan and the
U.S. have been well documented in the literature, their cyclical properties are less well known. When
we calculate the log-deviations from trend of the variables of interest, we observe that these major level
diﬀerences are smaller when analyzing their cyclical behavior. Note that for consistency in the comparison
of the data, we restrict the attention of cyclical properties of the variables to the common sample between
the U.S. and Japan, namely from 1983q1 to 2005q4. All of the analysis that follows is performed for this
sample period.
The unemployment rate, which had seen greater level movements for the U.S. than for Japan, shows
much smaller diﬀerences in terms of the cyclical changes. The bottom-left panel of Figure 1 shows the
high-frequency movements of the unemployment rate for both countries; it indicates that while Japan’s
unemployment ﬁgures seem to move less, the diﬀerence is much smaller that one might expect considering
the level movements. Table 1 shows that in fact the deviations from trend of unemployment in Japan are
only slightly less volatile than those for the U.S., with standard deviations of 5 and 8 percent, respectively.
Japan’s unemployment rate is also less auto-correlated than that of the U.S., 0.81 versus 0.88 ﬁrst-order
auto-correlation. Finally, unemployment in Japan is more counter-cyclical than the U.S. value, both with
respect to output per worker and TFP.9
The counterpart to workers looking for a job is ﬁrms looking for workers, which can be analyzed
through the vacancies posted in the economy. The cyclical properties of vacancies in Japan are not very
diﬀerent from those of the U.S. The bottom-left panel of Figure 1 displays the log-deviations from trend
for both countries, and Table 1 summarizes the properties. Vacancies are almost equally volatile in both
countries, with a standard deviation of 0.09 for Japan and 0.1 for the U.S.. At the same time, vacancies
are more auto-correlated and more pro-cyclical in Japan than in the U.S.
The job-ﬁnding and separation rates are also not dissimilar in terms of their cyclical variability between
the two countries, with a slightly higher volatility in Japan. The standard deviation of the ﬁnding and
separation rates are 0.08 and 0.09, respectively, for Japan, and 0.05 and 0.06 for the U.S. These two
countries do diﬀer, however, in terms of the auto-correlation and cross-correlation of the ﬁnding rate
with productivity, although less so for the separation rate. The autocorrelation for Japan is almost zero,
and it is more pro-cyclical than that of the U.S. The separation rate also has a very small ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation for Japan, and is more counter-cyclical. The U.S. has more auto-correlated ﬁnding and
separation rates, but these two rates are nearly acyclical. Hence, while Shimer (2005) argues the use of a
9Note that the U.S. data shows a positive correlation between cyclical unemployment and output per worker for this
period. This correlation is negative when a longer horizon is used. One reason for this change in the correlation sign, which
is not seen when using TFP as the measure of productivity, may be what has come to be known as the ’jobless’ recoveries
that the U.S. has experienced in recent decades.
7model with exogenous destruction by referring to the acyclicality of the separation rate in the data, for
the U.S. this rate is clearly counter-cyclical and more volatile for Japan. This is the reason that, in this
paper, we study versions of the model with endogenous job destruction, in addition to the version with
exogenous destruction.
One important variable in the labor market, which aﬀects the chances that workers and ﬁrms meet,
is the so-called market tightness. This variable, which is the ratio of unemployment to vacancies, is
more volatile than either of the two values individually, with a standard deviation of 0.13 for Japan and
0.18 for the U.S. Underlying this behavior of the market tightness is the negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, known as the Beveridge Curve, which can be observed for both countries
in Figure 2. One can clearly see that both variables move in opposite directions over time and have a
negative cross-correlation of 0.69 for Japan and 0.91 for the U.S.
The phenomenon commonly known as the “Shimer Puzzle,” formulated in Shimer (2005), relates to the
inability of the simple search and matching model to reproduce the U.S. cyclical volatility of the market
tightness for empirically reasonable movements of productivity. It is thus important to understand the
magnitude of the productivity changes in the economy. The last two columns of Table 1 show that
productivity has almost identical variability in both countries, with a standard deviation of 0.01 for both
output per worker and TFP.
In summary, considering the levels of the labor market variables, we ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences
between Japan and the U.S. However, in terms of the cyclicality of these variables, the discrepancies
are less striking. The main diﬀerences are that the unemployment rate and the market tightness are
less volatile for Japan than for the U.S., and that the cyclicality and auto-correlation of the ﬁnding and
separation rates also diﬀer between the two countries. Given these dissimilarities, we question whether
the “Shimer Puzzle” holds for the Japanese economy. In other words: are the stylized versions of the
search and matching model, when calibrated to match the long-run levels of the labor market variables
in Japan, able to reproduce its cyclical properties, particularly the volatility of the market tightness? Or,
as is the case for the U.S., does the model fail to generate enough volatility? We address these questions
in the following section by building the model, which will later be simulated and compared to the data.
3 The Model
We wish to analyze the ability of three diﬀerent versions of the search and matching model to reproduce
the previously explained empirical facts for the Japanese economy. The model presented below nests all
three versions; Section 4 explains the parameterization of the model such that it collapses into each of
the three submodels.
The ﬁrst model, Model 1, is a discrete-time version of the simple textbook search and matching model
8with exogenous job destruction, as used in Shimer (2005).10 Given that for the Japanese economy, the
separation rate is not as acyclical as that claimed by Shimer for the U.S., we then analyze a second version
of the model, Model 2, in which the separation rate is allowed to vary over the cycle. This second model is
a discrete-time version of the textbook model with endogenous destruction. Finally, since the goal of this
paper is to study whether the model can account for the cyclical properties of the data, in Model 3 we use
what has become the workhorse model in macroeconomics for analyzing business cycle ﬂuctuations, the
Real Business Cycle model, but with the labor market modeled with search frictions (using the features
of Model 2) to generate equilibrium unemployment and worker ﬂows between employment states.
In what follows, we present the general version of the model which nests Models 1, 2, and 3.
3.1 Environment
The model is a stationary discrete-time Real Business Cycle model with search frictions in the labor
market. The economy is composed of two types of inﬁnitely-lived agents: consumers/workers and ﬁrms.
There is only one good, which is produced using capital and labor and sold by the ﬁrms to the consumers.
The labor market is modeled in the style of the search and matching literature, with endogenous job
destruction. The replacement of the traditional Walrasian labor market for one with search frictions
allows the model to display involuntary unemployment in equilibrium, essential to the focus of this
paper.
The labor market is modeled in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where search frictions
exist, and workers and ﬁrms try to match and form employment relationships. Firms produce using
capital, labor, and available technology; matches are destroyed endogenously as an optimal decision by
the ﬁrm and the worker, or exogenously when hit by a negative shock.
Employment relationships are comprised of one worker and one ﬁrm, and matching occurs randomly
according to a constant returns to scale matching function, m(ut,v t), where ut is total unemployment
and vt is the number of vacancies. We deﬁne the market tightness as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
workers, θt ≡ vt






Similarly, the probability that a worker matches with a ﬁrm is θtqt (θt).
A job is destroyed for reasons exogenous to the match with probability λ.W e m o d e l e n d o g e n o u s
destruction by assuming that productive ﬁrms need to pay, in addition to labor and capital costs, a non-
productive intermediate input cost xt, which is idiosyncratic to each match. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc intermediate
input cost is independent and identically distributed across ﬁrms and time, with distribution function
G :[ xmin,x max] → [0,1]. A new idiosyncratic cost is drawn every period by existing matches, and if
the cost is too high, it may be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm and the worker to discontinue the employment
10Given that the model￿s most complete version requires discrete-time, all versions of the models are in discrete time.
9relationship. The value of xt that dissolves the match is denoted by ¯ xt. The probability of endogenous
job destruction is therefore 1 − G(¯ xt).
In a productive employment relationship, the ﬁrm produces output according to a constant returns
to scale production function which has hours and capital as inputs. The production function of the
individual ﬁrm is yt = Atf (kt,h t), where At is total factor productivity (TFP), and yt, kt,a n dht are
output, capital, and hours per worker, respectively.11 Hence, yt and kt are related to aggregate output
and capital according to the following equations:12
Yt = ntyt and Kt = ntkt. (1)
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the level of technology of the
economy is revealed, and every matched ﬁrm draws an idiosyncratic cost. These two variables determine
the number of productive and unproductive matches for the period. After endogenous destruction takes
place, the levels of employment and unemployment are determined. At that point, production starts
at ﬁrms, and vacancies and unemployed workers try to meet in the labor market. At the end of the
period, wages are paid and the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are distributed to the households, which decide how much
to consume and how much to save. Finally, the exogenous destruction shock takes place, which dissolves
some of matches.
3.2 The Agents’ Problems
Problem of the Household











Ct+i + Kt+i = Wt+i +Π t+i +( 1− δ)Kt+i−1 + rt+iKt+i−1 +( 1− nt+i)b, (3)
for i = {0,...,∞}, where β ≤ 1 is the discount rate of the economy; Ct is the consumption level of
the household; nt is the number of employed workers; H (ht) is the disutility suﬀered by each working
member of the family, where ht are the individual hours worked, chosen optimally between the ﬁrm and
the worker; Kt is the total capital in the economy, which is owned by the household; Wt are the total
11Matches diﬀer in terms of their idiosyncratic cost, which is assumed to be additive. This assumption, also used in
Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Trigari (2009), implies that the equilibrium optimal levels of capital and hours do not
depend on this cost and are the same across ﬁrms, which greatly simpliﬁes the model.
12As is shown later, every ﬁrm chooses the same amount of capital and hence produces the same quantity of output.
10wages paid to the workers of the household; Πt are the total proﬁts of the ﬁrms; rt is the rental rate of
capital and δ is its depreciation rate; b is the ﬂow utility from leisure.
This problem yields the standard consumption Euler equation, which shows how in equilibrium, the
individual is indiﬀerent between saving or consuming one more unit.
u￿ (Ct)=βEt {(1 + rt+1 − δ)u￿ (Ct+1)}. (4)
Problem of the Firm
Let us now analyze the problem of the ﬁrm. Denote by Vt and Jt (xt),m e a s u r e di nt e r m so fc o n s u m p t i o n ,
the value of posting a vacancy and hiring a worker, respectively.
Firms enter the labor market by posting vacancies and, when matched with a worker, implement
optimal production plans in order to maximize their proﬁts. Posting a vacancy has a ﬂow cost of φ for
the ﬁrm. A vacant ﬁrm matches with a worker with probability qt =
m(θt)
θt
. If the ﬁrm is matched and
the idiosyncratic cost is low enough, the ﬁrm obtains the value of being ﬁlled in the following period,
otherwise it remains as a vacancy. The value of a vacancy is hence





dG(xt+1)+( 1− qtG(¯ xt+1))Vt+1

, (5)
where βt = β
u
￿(Ct+1)
u￿(Ct) is the stochastic discount factor, which ﬁrms and workers use to discount the future.
¯ xt+1 is the value for x that makes the ﬁrm willing to hire the worker.
In equilibrium, we assume the free entry of ﬁrms, which implies that the value of posting a vacancy





The value for the ﬁlled ﬁrm is




The interpretation of the previous equation is as follows. During the current period, given the idiosyncratic
cost xt, the ﬁrm produces output and pays wages, the rental cost of capital, and intermediate inputs, xt.
The following period, if the match is not exogenously destroyed, which occurs with probability λ,a n di f
the idiosyncratic cost is below the threshold, the match is still productive, with a value of Jt+1 (xt+1),
otherwise the match is destroyed and becomes a vacancy, which has a value of zero. The ﬁrm chooses
capital kt to maximize the value of the match, which implies the traditional condition that capital is
rented to the point where its marginal cost equals its marginal product. Therefore
rt = Atfk (kt,h t). (8)
11We can now deﬁne the total proﬁts of the ﬁrms, which are rebated to the workers, as
Πt = nt [Atf (kt,h t) − wt (xt)ht − rtkt − ˜ xt] − vtφ,




Problem of the Worker
Consider now the worker’s perspective. Denote by Ut and Nt (xt),m e a s u r e di nt e r m so fc o n s u m p t i o n ,
the value of being unemployed and being matched with a ﬁrm.
An unemployed worker obtains b utility from leisure, home production, or unemployment beneﬁts. If
he matches with a ﬁrm, which happens with probability pt = m(θt),a n dt h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cc o s tf o rt h e
ﬁrm is below the threshold, ¯ xt+1, the worker becomes productive in the following period. If he does not
enter into an employment relationship with a ﬁrm, he remains unemployed. Hence, the value of being
unemployed at period t is:





Nt+1 (xt+1)dG(xt+1)+( 1− ptG(¯ xt+1))Ut+1

 (9)
As in the case of the ﬁrm, the match value for a worker is a function of the idiosyncratic shock xt.
The value of employment for a worker is composed of the wage, the disutility in terms of consumption
from supplying labor, and the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is
not destroyed (either endogenously or exogenously), or the value of being unemployed if it is destroyed.















3.3 Surplus, Wages, Hours, and the Destruction Threshold
When an employment relationship takes place, it creates a surplus that is shared between the ﬁrm and
the worker. The surplus of the match is deﬁned as the sum of the values of a ﬁlled job for a ﬁrm and
a worker minus their outside options, which are the value of a vacancy and the value of unemployment,
respectively. As there is free entry of ﬁrms, the expression for the surplus is St (xt)=Jt (xt)+Nt (xt)−Ut.
Wages and hours in the economy are chosen as the Nash solution to a bargaining problem, where η
is the bargaining power of the worker.
max
wt(xt),ht
(Nt (xt) − Ut)
η (Jt (xt) − Vt)
1−η .
The solution to the previous problem with respect to wages delivers a pair of conditions for sharing
the surplus, according to which the worker and ﬁrm receive constant shares of the surplus equal to their
12bargaining power. These expressions are
Nt (xt) − Ut = ηSt (xt),J t (xt)=( 1− η)St (xt). (11)
Surplus
Combining the previous two conditions with equations (7) to (10), the surplus for a match can be expressed
as:
St (xt)=Atf (kt,h t) − rtkt − xt −
H (ht)
u￿ (Ct)





Using the expression for the surplus (12), along with the sharing rules in (11) and the job-creation
condition (6), we can derive the wage paid to the worker. The expression for the wage is:







The worker is compensated for a fraction η of the ﬂow of proﬁts to the ﬁrm, and for a measure of
the saved cost of searching for new matches. It is also compensated for a proportion (1 − η) of the home
production lost and the disutility of supplying hours of work.
Hours
As in the case of wages, hours are chosen to maximise the Nash product. At the optimum, hours worked




= Atf￿ (kt,h t) (14)
Destruction Threshold
An employment relationship is terminated when the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm is so low that
it drives the surplus to zero. This determines the threshold productivity below which both worker and
ﬁrm agree to dissolve the match and search for better options. Using equation (12) and equating it to
zero, we obtain the expression for the threshold:
¯ xt = Atf (kt,h t) − rtkt −
H (ht)
u￿ (Ct)




133.4 Worker Flows and Transition Rates
Given the timing of the labor market as explained earlier and all of the decisions of the agents in the
economy, we can obtain the ﬂows in and out of the diﬀerent states for the workers:
ut =( 1− pt−1G(¯ xt))ut−1 +[ 1− (1 − λ)G(¯ xt)]nt−1 (16)
nt =1− ut (17)
In this more general version of the model, the probability of a worker transitioning from unemploy-
ment to employment, commonly known as the ﬁnding rate, is pt−1G(¯ xt).S i m i l a r l y , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f
transitioning from employment to unemployment, or the separation rate, is 1 − (1 − λ)G(¯ xt).
3.5 Equilibrium
Ac o m pe t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u mi sas e to fp r i c e s{rt,w t (xt)}
∞
t=0 and allocations {Yt,K t+1,C t,k t,n t,u t,v t,θ t, ¯ xt}
∞
t=0
which satisfy that (i) agents optimize, i.e. the household’s optimal condition (4), the value functions in
the labor market (6) to (10), the capital rental optimal condition (8), the optimal hours condition (14),
and the optimal surplus sharing rules (11) are satisﬁed; and (ii) markets clear for consumption goods,
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 −(1 − δ)Kt −(1 − nt)b+φvt +nxT
t ;c a p i t a l ,e q u a t i o n( 1 ) ;a n dl a b o r ,e q u a t i o n s( 1 6 )a n d
(17).
4 Parameterization
We now proceed to explain the method used to parameterize the model, and how the previously presented
model is collapsed into Models 1, 2, and 3.
We choose functional forms that are standard in the literature and then calibrate the parameters
of the model to match the Japanese empirical evidence for the average of the sample period, which is
assumed to represent the steady state of the model. We set the length of the period to one month, as in
the data presented in Section 2.
The per-period utility function for consumption is assumed to be linear for Models 1 and 2, u(Ct)=Ct,





latter, where for Models 1 and 2, we set an = ζ =0 . Following Trigari (2006), we set ζ = 10 for Model
3, and we calibrate an such that using the optimal hours equation (14), the implied steady state value of
hours is 1/3. We set an =2 .3e5 . The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, which is a standard value for a
monthly model.




t .F o rM o d e l s1a n d2 ,w es e tα = χ =0 . For model 3, following Braun, Esteban-Pretel, Okada, and
14Sudou (2006), we set α =0 .38 and χ =0 .62.W ea l s of o l l o wt h a tp a p e ri ns e t t i n gt h ed e p r e c i a t i o nr a t e
of capital, δ,t o0i nM o d e l s1a n d2 ,a n dt o0 . 0 0 9 4i nM o d e l3 .
In the labor market, we assume that the worker’s bargaining power, η,i s0 . 5 ,a si sc o n v e n t i o n a li nt h e




t .W ef o l l o w
the norm in these types of models and set the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment, ξ,t o
0.5, so as to satisfy the Hosios condition. The exogenous destruction probability, λ,i ss e tt o0i nM o d e l s
2a n d3 .F o rM o d e l1 ,w ec a l i b r a t ei tt ob eλ =0 .0042, which is the monthly separation rate in Japan for
the sample studied. For the models with endogenous destruction, Models 2 and 3, the idiosyncratic cost





ϕ, which only requires the calibration of
one parameter, the mean of the distribution, ϕ.H e n c e ,xmin =0and xmax = ∞. For Model 1, which
has only exogenous destruction, we assume that xmin = xmax =0,s ot h a tt h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cc o s t sa r e
0a ta l lt i m e sa n dp r o d u c en oe n d o g e n o u ss e p a r a t i o n .ϕ is jointly calibrated with the scaling parameter
in the matching function, µ,a n dt h ec o s to fp o s t i n gav a c a n c y ,φ,t om a t c ht h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n d
the probability of leaving unemployment in Japan over the sample period, respectively 0.034 and 0.13,
and a market tightness of unity.13 We set µ =0 .12 in all three models; φ =0 .48 in Model 1, φ =0 .17 in
Model 2, and φ =0 .19 in Model 3; ϕ =0 .65 and ϕ =1 .76 in Models 2 and 3, respectively.
We assume that the value of leisure, home production, or unemployment beneﬁt, b,i saf r a c t i o no f
the output that the average worker would produce in the ﬁrm, identical in standard search and matching
models to the marginal product of one worker. We follow Shimer (2005) in setting this fraction to 0.4 in
all three versions of the model.14 The implied values of b are 0.4 in Model 1, 0.15 in Model 2, and 0.24
in Model 3.
Finally, productivity is assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order 1, At = A(1−ρ)A
ρ
t−1e￿t,





.W e s e t ρ =0 .755 and σ￿ =0 .0085 in Models 1 and 2 in order to match the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and standard deviation in the data on output per worker. For Model 3, since
the measure of productivity in the model is TFP, we match those two moments of TFP in the data and
set ρ =0 .9 and σ￿ =0 .0063.
The values of the model parameters are summarized in Table 2.
13As explained in Shimer (2005), changing the value of the market tightness only rescales the value of µ,l e a v i n ga l lo t h e r
values unchanged.
14We use this number for the ﬂow value of unemployment to render our results comparable with those of Shimer (2005).
As we later argue, increasing this value changes the results of the model, concordant with the ﬁndings ofpublications such
as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
155 Simulation Results
We now proceed to explain how the simulations of the model, in its three diﬀerent versions, compare to
the data. These results are shown in Table 3 with the empirical moments, for easy comparison.15
The second line of each panel in Table 3 shows the simulation results for Model 1, which is the simple
exogenous destruction version of the model. We see that the model fails to account for the volatility
of all of the variables, explaining less than 5% of the variability in the data for most variables. In
particular, the model generates around 2% of the volatility of unemployment (0.0013 standard deviation
in the model versus 0.049 in the data), and slightly more for vacancies (0.0054 standard deviation in the
model versus 0.13 in the data). Despite the fact that the model correctly generates a downward sloping
Beveridge curve, as seen in the cross-correlation of unemployment and vacancies of -0.4 in the model,
this correlation is smaller than in the data (-0.69). More importantly, the market tightness in the model
has less variability.
As is the case for the U.S., the simple exogenous destruction search and matching model is not able
to replicate the empirical volatility of the market tightness for Japan. The reasons for this failure are the
same as those noted by Shimer (2005). The assumption of Nash bargaining for wage determination makes
wages too sensitive to movements in productivity. Wages in the model absorb an inordinate fraction of
the potential increases in proﬁts due to increases in productivity (in the case of a positive shock), and
this mechanism reduces the incentive for ﬁrms to post new vacancies, which in turn reduces the response
of unemployment to productivity shocks. The low variability of both vacancies and unemployment in
the model generates the low volatility of the modelled market tightness compared to the data. As shown
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), one way to reconcile this simple model with the empirical ﬁndings
is to assume that the ﬂow value of unemployment, b,i sm u c hl a r g e r ,a n dv e r yc l o s et ot h es t e a d y - s t a t e
productivity level. While we do not report it in the table, increasing the value of b in the model to 95
%o ft h es t e a d y - s t a t ep r o d u c t i v i t yl e v e la l s ob r i n g st h eJ a p a n e s ec a l i b r a t i o no ft h em o d e lc l o s et ot h e
data.16
Hence, despite the observed diﬀerences between Japan and the U.S. highlighted in Section 2, the
simple exogenous version of the model fails to reproduce the Japanese data, as is also the case for the
U.S. However, Model 1 assumes constant and exogenous job destruction. As we showed in Section 2,
this deviates from the data for Japan, where the separation rate is clearly counter-cyclical. For this
reason, we now consider the simulation results when allowing for variable and endogenous changes in the
15The model is simulated for 264 months, the equivalent of the data sample. We then calculate quarterly averages of the
monthly rates and detrend using the HP ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. We repeat the simulation 1000 times
and calculate the average and standard deviation of all the simulations. The model is simulated using the Dynare package,
version 3.065.
16These simulation results are available from the authors upon request.
16job-destruction rate.
Model 2, which allows for endogenous movements in the separation rate, is able to generate more
volatility for unemployment and vacancies than Model 1. The volatility of unemployment is in fact within
two standard deviations of the data, and the model accounts for around half of the volatility of vacancies.
However, the inclusion of endogenous separation in the model, while generating higher volatility in these
two variables, has the negative side eﬀect of inverting the sign of the correlation between unemployment
and vacancies, 0.8 in this version of the model. This implies that the volatility of the market tightness
in the model is still much lower than in the data, 0.015 versus 0.13.
Allowing for time-varying endogenous separations generates higher volatility in unemployment and
vacancies, since two margins (hiring and ﬁring) are at work in the model. In times of prosperity, more
workers are hired and fewer are separated, with the opposite occurring during recessions. However, in this
version of the model, the vacancies are slightly countercyclical, which produces the positive correlation
with unemployment. This positive correlation in the model can best be understood by observing the
impulse response functions of these two variables to a positive technology shock. We can see in Figure 5
how after a positive technology shock, the expectation of future proﬁts causes ﬁrms to post more vacancies
and reduce ﬁring (lowering the job-separation rate), both of which reduce unemployment. The drop in
unemployment is larger than that observed in Model 1, as the separation margin also operates. Shortly
after the initial shock, the drop in unemployment, which reduces the probability of a given ﬁrm meeting
aw o r k e r ,l o w e r st h ei n c e n t i v et op o s tv a c a n c i e sa n db r i n g st h i sv a r i a b l eb e l o wt h es t e a d ys t a t el e v e l .
Thereafter, as unemployment returns to the steady state level, so do vacancies. The impulse response
functions show that the larger drop in unemployment due to the time-varying endogenous separation in
the model, which produces the larger volatility, is what drives vacancies to move in a similar direction to
unemployment and produces the counter-factual upward-sloping Beveridge curve in the model.
Finally, Model 3, which includes a general equilibrium structure with curvature in the utility function,
capital accumulation, and hours in the production function, generates even more volatility than Model
2 for unemployment and vacancies. This version of the model produces an excess of volatility for these
two variables. However, since it once more generates a counter-factual positive correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, it is still unable to generate enough volatility in the market tightness
compared to the Japanese data.
In Model 3, the inclusion of capital and hours in the production function generates the larger move-
ments in unemployment. In this case, in order to take full advantage of the productivity shocks, ﬁrms
have greater incentives to retain workers, which produces a larger drop in the separation rate and in
unemployment. However, the great decrease in unemployment means that ﬁrms have little incentive to
post vacancies, given the competition for the available unemployed workers. In this model, vacancies and
unemployment are highly positively correlated, and despite the higher volatility of these two variables,
17the market tightness displays hardly any variability.
In summary, we have shown that despite the diﬀerences between the Japanese and U.S. labor markets,
the volatility puzzle asserted for the U.S. economy also holds for Japan. We have shown this failure in
three fairly standard versions of the model. Future research should explore particular features that might
be introduced to the model to reconcile the theory with the Japanese empirical evidence presented in
Section 2. As mentioned earlier, there are ﬁxes proposed in the literature when discussing the puzzle for
the U.S. that are applicable for Japan, such as increasing the ﬂow value of unemployment. Speciﬁcally for
Japan, Miyamoto (2009) studies whether introducing training costs in the simple exogenous separation
version of the model helps to reconcile theory and data. An analysis of all possible features of the model
explored in this growing literature and their eﬀects is beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for
subsequent research.
6 Conclusions
In recent years, the standard method of modelling equilibrium unemployment has been criticised due to its
inability to reproduce some important cyclical elements in the data. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) show
that the simple search and matching model is incapable of reproducing the U.S. empirical volatility of
the market tightness for reasonable movements in productivity. Other authors have studied whether this
so-called “Shimer Puzzle” also holds for other economies. This paper considers the case of the Japanese
economy.
There are known diﬀerences between the labor markets of Japan and the U.S. We document the
diﬀerences and similarities of the two economies in terms of unemployment rates, worker ﬂow probabilities,
and productivity. We examine the diﬀerences in levels, as well as in the cyclical properties of the main
labor market variables. We ﬁnd that in both economies, the diﬀerences in the levels of the two labor
market variables are more notable than their deviations from the steady state, although the cyclical
properties of these variables diﬀer enough to ask whether the “Shimer Puzzle” also holds for Japan.
We build, parameterize, and simulate three diﬀerent versions of the search and matching model to
study the puzzle’s validity for Japan: one with exogenous job destruction, one with endogenous job
destruction, and a more elaborate Real Business Cycle model with a search and marching labor market.
We ﬁnd that the “Shimer Puzzle” does indeed also hold for Japan. None of the three versions of the
model is able to generate as much volatility for the market tightness as is present in the data. The model
fails either because produces too little volatility in unemployment and vacancies, or because it generates
ac o u n t e r - f a c t u a lu p w a r d - s l o p i n gB e v e r i d g ec u r v e .
Recent literature has considered various ways of reconciling the model with the data for the U.S. Some
of the proposed ﬁxes, such as that of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), also function for Japan. Future
18work should explore more Japan-speciﬁc features of the model that could help to bring it closer to the
data.
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21Table 1: Japan and U.S. Labor Market Cyclical Properties
Japan U.S.









Std. Dev. 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Autocorr. 0.81 0.93 0.93 -0.08 0.10 0.41 0.62 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.71 0.59 0.70 0.64
Cross-corr.
u 1- 0 . 6 9- 0 . 7 5- 0 . 2 4 0 . 3 2 - 0 . 4 7 - 0 . 5 4 1 - 0 . 9 1- 0 . 9 7- 0 . 8 70 . 7 9 0 . 1 3 - 0 . 1 9
v 10 . 9 90 . 3 4 - 0 . 5 1 0 . 4 6 0 . 7 0 1 0 . 9 80 . 8 3- 0 . 7 60 . 1 1 0 . 1 5
v/u 10 . 3 3 - 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 0 0 . 7 2 1 0 . 8 7- 0 . 7 9 0 . 0 0 40 . 1 7
f 1- 0 . 5 9 0 . 1 6 0 . 2 6 1 - 0 . 5 8- 0 . 1 1 0 . 2 2
s 1- 0 . 2 3- 0 . 3 7 1 - 0 . 0 6- 0 . 0 9
Prod. y/n 10 . 9 1 1 0 . 3 0
Prod. TFP 11
Notes: u is the unemployment rate; v is vacancies; f is the monthly probability of moving from unemployment to
employment, or the job-ﬁnding rate; s is the monthly probability of moving from employment to unemployment,
or the job separation rate; y/n is output per worker; and TFP is total factor productivity. All data are quarterly
(f and s are quarterly averages of the monthly rates), from 1983q1 to 2005q4, seasonally adjusted using the X-12
method of the Census Bureau, logged and HP ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
22Table 2: Parameter Values
Exogenous parameters βξη ζ αχ δ¯ A
Model 1: Exog. Dest. 0.99 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 1
Model 2: Endog. Dest. 0.99 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 1
Model 3: RBC + Endog. Dest. 0.99 0.5 0.5 10 0.38 0.62 0.0094 1
Endogenous parameters µλϕ φ b a n σε ρε
Model 1: Exog. Dest. 0.12 0.0042 0 0.48 0.4 0 0.0085 0.75
Model 2: Endog. Dest. 0.12 0 0.65 0.17 0.15 0 0.0085 0.75
Model 3: RBC + Endog. Dest. 0.12 0 1.76 0.19 0.24 2.33e5 0.0063 0.9
23Table 3: Simulation Results





Data 0.049 0.087 0.13 0.084 0.091 0.010 0.010
Model 1: Exog. Dest. 0.0013 0.0047 0.0054 0.0027 0.010
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0011)
Model 2: Endog. Dest. 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.008 0.044 0.010
(0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0048) (0.0011)
Model 3: RBC + Endog. Dest. 0.282 0.270 0.018 0.011 0.507 0.010
(0.055) (0.053) (0.002) (0.001) (0.063) (0.001)





Data 0.82 0.93 0.93 -0.083 0.097 0.41 0.62
Model 1: Exog. Dest. 0.78 0.33 0.41 0.41 0.41
(0.047) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Model 2: Endog. Dest. 0.78 0.65 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
(0.046) (0.075) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.100)
Model 3: RBC + Endog. Dest. 0.82 0.82 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.62
(0.043) (0.042) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.083)





Data 1.00 -0.69 -0.75 -0.24 0.32 -0.47 -0.54
Model 1: Exog. Dest. 1.00 -0.40 -0.60 -0.60 -0.60
(0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Model 2: Endog. Dest. 1.00 0.80 -0.57 -0.57 0.57 -0.57
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Model 3: RBC + Endog. Dest. 1.00 1.00 -0.66 -0.65 0.63 -0.72
(0.0004) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.026)
Notes: u is the unemployment rate; v is vacancies; f is the monthly probability of moving from unemployment to
employment, or the job-ﬁnding rate; s is the monthly probability of moving from employment to unemployment,
or the job separation rate; y/n is output per worker; and TFP is total factor productivity. The data spans 88
quarters from 1983q1 to 2005q4. The model is simulated for 264 months and then averaged by quarter to obtain
88 quarters of simulated data. Both the data and the model simulations are seasonally adjusted using the X-12
method of the Census Bureau, logged and HP ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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